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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
RUTLEDGE V. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE 
MANAGEMENT ASS’N1 
The United States Supreme Court upheld an Arkansas law 
regulating how pharmacies are reimbursed by pharmacy benefit 
managers.  In Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management 
Ass’n, a unanimous Court decided that Arkansas Act 900, passed 
in 2015, was not pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).   
 Act 900 ensures that rural and independent pharmacies are 
reimbursed by pharmacy benefit managers—the intermediaries 
between pharmacies and prescription drug plans—an amount 
equal to or higher than the price pharmacies pay to get their drugs.  
After the Act’s passage in 2015, Pharmaceutical Care 
Management Association, a national trade organization 
representing the 11 largest pharmacy benefit managers in the 
country, filed suit in the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging the 
Act was pre-empted by ERISA.  The District Court agreed, and 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the Act was not pre-empted by ERISA 
because it “has neither an impermissible connection with nor 
reference to ERISA.”   
 Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion and explained that 
ERISA pre-empts state laws that govern a “central matter of plan 
administration” or that “interfere[] with nationally uniform plan 
administration.”  However, ERISA does not pre-empt state laws 
that “merely increase costs or alter incentives for ERISA plans 
without forcing plans to adopt any particular scheme of 
substantive coverage.”  Neither does it pre-empt state laws that 
act immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans or “where the 
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”  
1 Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, No. 18-540, 2020 WL 7250098 
(U.S. Dec. 10, 2020).   
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Because the Court determined that Act 900 amounted only to 
indirect cost regulation with no impermissible connection or 
reference to ERISA, it upheld the law.  Justice Thomas wrote a 
separate concurrence because he “continue[s] to doubt” the 
Court’s ERISA pre-emption jurisprudence but nevertheless 
agreed that the Court properly applied those precedents.   
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN V. 
CUOMO2 
In one of her first appearances in a Supreme Court decision, 
Justice Barrett provided the fifth vote in Roman Catholic Diocese 
of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, a 5-4 decision granting temporary 
injunctive relief to religious organizations in New York from 
strict COVID-19 restrictions imposed by Governor Cuomo.  The 
Governor’s executive order limited in-person attendance at 
religious services to 10 people for services in “red” zones and 25 
people for services in “orange” zones, no matter the size of the 
facility or the protective measures taken.  The Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Brooklyn and Agudath Israel of America applied for 
emergency relief, arguing that the restrictions in these zones 
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
because the restrictions treated houses of worship worse than 
comparable secular facilities.   
 A majority of the Court issued a per curiam opinion ruling 
that the applicants were “clearly” entitled to relief pending appeal 
because they showed “that their First Amendment claims are 
likely to prevail, that denying them relief would lead to 
irreparable injury, and that granting relief would not harm the 
public interest.”  Specifically, the majority noted the discrepancy 
between restrictions for houses of worship and businesses 
categorized as “essential.”  For example, while a church or 
synagogue in a “red” zone could not admit more than 10 people, 
an acupuncture facility could admit as many people as it wished.  
The majority ruled that the restrictions were not “neutral” and 
were not likely “narrowly tailored” to survive strict scrutiny.   
 Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh wrote separate 
concurrences.  Justice Gorsuch’s lively concurrence lamented the 
2 Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020). 
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strict restrictions imposed on religious services while hardware 
stores, liquor stores, bicycle repair shops, and lawyers (among 
other things) were considered “essential” under the executive 
order.  Gorsuch also argued with the dissenting Justices, which 
would have denied the applications for various reasons.  Chief 
Justice Roberts, dissenting, reasoned that injunctive relief was not 
warranted because Governor Cuomo had retracted the 10- and 25-
person limits a few days before the Court’s decision, relegating 
the applicants’ facilities to the more favorable “yellow” zone 
restrictions.  Justice Gorsuch argued that nothing prevented the 
Governor from reinstating the challenged restrictions, and “[t]o 
turn away religious leaders bringing meritorious claims just 
because the Governor decided to hit the ‘off’ switch in the shadow 
of our review would be, in my view, just another sacrifice of 
fundamental rights in the name of judicial modesty.”  Justice 
Breyer, dissenting, stressed that injunctive relief is an 
“extraordinary remedy” and that it was “far from clear” that the 
restrictions violated the Free Exercise Clause.   
 The Court’s decision came after two prior COVID-19 
decisions in which the Court, with the help of Justice Ginsburg, 
denied injunctive relief from similar (but less restrictive) limits 
imposed on religious services in California3 and Nevada.4  Justice 
Sotomayor, in her separate dissent, would have followed those 
decisions, arguing that this was an even “easier” case to defer to 
the judgment of health officials and executive authorities.  
3 S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
4 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).   
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MYERS V. YAMATO KOGYO CO.5 
and 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR, CO. V. WALTHER6 
In two recent cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court clarified 
that Arkansas courts should not defer to agency interpretations of 
statutes.  In both cases, the justices were unanimous on the point,7 
declaring that “agency interpretations of statutes will be reviewed 
de novo.”8   
 Myers involved the interpretation of the Arkansas 
“exclusive remedy statute” for purposes of determining whether 
the parent companies of a certain corporation were immune from 
a wrongful death action brought by the plaintiff after she already 
received workers’ compensation following the work-related 
death of her husband.  The Arkansas Worker’s Compensation 
Commission sided with the parent companies, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed that decision.  The Supreme Court affirmed but 
took the opportunity to clarify the “confusion in prior cases 
regarding the standard of review for agency interpretations of a 
statute.”   
 Justice Womack, writing for the majority, explained that 
some past cases have adopted a perplexing standard of review in 
which the courts decide issues of statutory interpretation de novo, 
but an agency’s interpretation is highly persuasive and will not be 
overturned unless “clearly wrong.”  Citing separation of powers 
concerns, the Court decided to abandon the “clearly wrong” 
standard and adopt a purely “de novo” standard of review for 
agency interpretations.  “After all, it is the province and duty of 
this Court to determine what a statute means.”  The Court further 
explained, however, that, in cases where ambiguity exists in the 
5 Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 2020 Ark. 135, 597 S.W.3d 613 (2020). 
6 Am. Honda Motor, Co. v. Walther, 2020 Ark. 349, 610 S.W.3d 633 
(2020).   
7 Justice Hart wrote a lone dissent in Myers because she disagreed with 
the majority’s interpretation of the statute, but she did not express any 
disagreement with the de novo standard of review adopted by the Court.  The 
Court in American Honda was unanimous.   
8 Myers, 2020 Ark. 135, at 5, 597 S.W.3d at 617; Am. Honda, 2020 Ark. 
349, at 5, 610 S.W.3d at 636.   
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statute’s text, “the agency’s interpretation will be one of our many 
tools used to provide guidance.”  This represents a significant 
departure from the federal courts’ deferential standard under 
Chevron,9 in which federal courts defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.10   
 American Honda involved the interpretation of the 
Arkansas Tax Procedure Act.  The Pulaski County Circuit Court 
(without the benefit of the Myers ruling at the time) deferred to 
the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration’s 
(“DFA”) interpretation of the Act.  American Honda appealed and 
argued that, while the recent Myers case dealt with the 
interpretation of a workers’ compensation law, the case decided 
more broadly that courts should not give deference to agency 
interpretations.  The unanimous Supreme Court agreed and cited 
Myers for its clarification that “judicial review of the DFA’s 
interpretation of the Tax Procedure Act is de novo.” 
CLINTON T. SUMMERS 
9 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).   
10 See id. at 843-45. 
